

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

ER 5633-82

CMTE-24

5 August 1982

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Members, Senior Interagency Group-Intelligence

SUBJECT: SIG-I Directive No. 1

REFERENCE: Memo from Director, Intelligence Community Staff to Members, Ad Hoc Working Group, 28 July 1982, subject: Implementation of Action Plan Tabled at 12 July 1982 SIG-I Meeting

1. I have decided to issue the attached SIG-I Directive No. 1 after having reviewed Community responses to the draft Directive which was circulated via reference. In most cases, consultation with senior officials resulted in concurrences with only minor changes in language. Those have been incorporated. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), however, suggested two significant changes:

a. Membership on the two IGs (IG/CI and IG/CM) for representatives of each of the three Military Services--Army, Navy, and Air Force; and

b. Chairmanship of the IG/CM by the representative of the Secretary of Defense.

2. I have concurred in the rationale for the changes and have incorporated General Stilwell's suggestions in the text of the directive, along with additional procedural guidance for the IG structure:

a. There will not be a formal voting procedure among members of the IGs. The IGs are Working Groups developing policy positions and reporting to the SIG-I. In reaching IG consensus on views, the representative of the Secretary of Defense is charged to represent the consensus views of the Military Services as part of the Department of Defense position.

b. The chairmen of the IG/CI and IG/CM are responsible to the Chairman of the SIG-I.


3. The national structure in the attached directive gives us the opportunity to obtain policy decisions for which no policy mechanism now exists, and to resolve departmental or agency differences having significant adverse national security consequences. The President desires an improved counterintelligence-countermeasure posture against the hostile intelligence

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threat, and I believe this structure provides the opportunity to meet his desire.

4. I would appreciate early identification of the designees for chairmen and members of the IG/CI and IG/CM so that arrangements can be made for the IGs to meet and commence activities soon. Please provide this information to

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William J. Casey
Chairman

Senior Interagency Group-Intelligence

Attachment:
SIG-I Directive No. 1

5 August 1982

SENIOR INTERAGENCY GROUP-INTELLIGENCE

DIRECTIVE NO. 1

SUBJECT: Counterintelligence and Countermeasure Responsibilities of the SIG-I and Subordinate Interagency Groups

1. The counterintelligence and countermeasure responsibilities of the SIG-I and the structure and responsibilities of subordinate Interagency Groups (IGs) are set forth below pursuant to the authorities in NSDD-2, "National Security Council Structure," dated 12 January 1982 and my duties as Chairman of the SIG-I.

2. The SIG-I is responsible, under the general aegis of the National Security Council, for national policy to protect the United States against the total foreign intelligence threat by means of counterintelligence (CI) and other countermeasures (CM), including protective security but excluding counterterrorism, which is the responsibility of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T) established by NSDD-30 and chaired by a representative of the Secretary of State. Specific CI and CM responsibilities of the SIG-I include those set forth in subparagraphs 4-7 of Section V(C) of NSDD-2. To assist the SIG-I in its CI and CM work, two IGs are established, with the chairmen responsible to the Chairman of the SIG-I. The IGs are Working Groups developing policy positions and reporting to the SIG-I. There will not be a formal voting procedure among members of the IGs. In reaching IG consensus on views, the representative of the Secretary of Defense is charged to represent the consensus views of the Military Services as part of the Department of Defense position.

- a. An IG/CI chaired by the Director, FBI or his representative is established responsible for national counterintelligence policy under the SIG-I, including counterespionage and the countering of "active measures." Membership will consist of one representative of each SIG-I member; of the Director, FBI; of the Director, NSA; and of each of the three Military Services--Army, Navy, and Air Force. Representatives of other Departments, Agencies, and Committees with responsibility for specific matters to be considered may attend meetings by invitation of the Chairman.

- b. An IG/CM chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense or his representative is established responsible for all other national countermeasure policy under the SIG-I, including countermeasures against technical threats such as SIGINT and imagery; and protective security measures including personnel, physical, information, document, industrial, computer, communications, and operations security. The functions of the IG/CM in the aforementioned areas, however, shall not affect, displace or otherwise be inconsistent with the responsibilities assigned any department or agency head, or those assigned any other interagency body by law, Executive order or Presidential directive. Membership will consist of one representative of each SIG-I member; of the Director, FBI; of the Director, NSA; and of each of the three Military Services--Army, Navy and Air Force. Representatives of other Departments, Agencies, and Committees with responsibility for specific matters to be considered may attend by invitation of the Chairman.

3. The interagency-staffed Community Counterintelligence Staff (CCIS) of the Intelligence Community Staff (ICS) will serve as the permanent secretariat for and provide staff support to the IG/CI and the IG/CM under the Director, ICS, who is Executive Secretary of the SIG-I. ICS/CCIS will be responsible for preparation for the NSC/SIG-I of an overall annual assessment, required by NSDD-2, of the relative threat to U.S. interests from intelligence and security services of foreign powers, and of the effectiveness of U.S. counterintelligence and other countermeasure activities. (The NSDD-30 mechanism of the IG/T and the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism will be used for preparation of a required overall annual assessment of the relative threat to U.S. interests from international terrorist activities, and an assessment of the effectiveness of U.S. counterterrorism activities.)

4. Matters for which SIG-I action is sought will normally first be addressed by the appropriate IG and referred via the Secretariat. However, at the discretion of the SIG-I principals, a proposal may be brought directly to the Group through the Executive Secretary or his designee.


5. In carrying out its CI and CM responsibilities, the SIG-I and its subordinate IG/CI and IG/CM will serve as the national-level authority within the Executive Branch under the NSC and the President. Matters which can be handled adequately at lower levels do not need to be brought to the SIG-I and its IGs. The objective is to avoid layering while providing a national policy/decision mechanism where none now exists. This mechanism can also be used to raise and resolve departmental or agency differences having significant adverse national security consequences.

6. As their first tasks, the IG/CI and IG/CM will review the recommendations of the March 1982 national threat and countermeasure

assessment, and the possibilities for enhancement of the national CI/CM effort recommended in the July 1982 study, "Capabilities Against the Hostile Intelligence Threat, 1983-1988." Within the general framework set forth in my 15 July 1982 letter to the President forwarding the study, the IG reviews should develop for early SIG-I consideration and action:

- a. A selected and prioritized listing of new policy and legal measures, and
- b. A selected and prioritized listing of resource enhancements for detailed follow up by program managers under budgetary procedures.

Those enhancements falling within the NFIP which are most critical and cost-effective will receive direct support. Those outside of the NFIP will be monitored and supported separately in their own resource acquisition mechanisms.


William J. Casey
Chairman
Senior Interagency Group-Intelligence

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